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No. 71-227 OT 1971 
UNITED STATES v. ALLEGHENY-LUDLUM STEEL CORP. 
On Appeal from the USDC for WD Pennsylvania (3-Judge Court) (Aldisert, 
USCJ, Marsh, USDJ and Miller, USDJ). 
This case involves one of a series of orders of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission directed toward the problem of railroad freigl1t car - -
supply and distribution on the nation's railroads. The order under considera--
tion was generally omosed by both shippers and the railroad industry, 
represented in the USDC by such organizations as the Association of 
American Railroads, the American Iron and steel Institute, the National 
Industrial Traffic League, and the National Association of Shippers 
2. 
Advisory Boards. The USDC permanently enjoined enforcement of the ICC 
order. Less than three months later, a three-judge USDC sitting in the -M~JJ..Ie... 
lllil8. District of Florida specifically rejected the conclusions of the USDC 
for WD Pennsylvania, and held the order to be a reasonable exercise of ICC 
power, based upon substantial and sufficient evidence in the record before 
the ICC. 
FACTS 
In 1963 the ICC undertook a study to ascertain the adequacy of the 
nation's supply of railroad freight cars. In 1964 the ICC determined that 
there existed "a substantial inadequacy" of freight car ownership among 
Americas railroads. A notice of proposed rulemaking was issued, 
broadening the inquiry to include all phases of car ownership, utilization, 
and distribution, with a view toward alleviating the car shortage. A seven -
year study ensued, after which the trial examiner concluded that there 
not competent evidence upon which to base a conclusion as to the adequacy 
of freight car ownership, and that the proposed car service rules (the 
subject of the order under review) had not been shown to be justified. 
Eighteen months later, in August, 1969, the ICC reached contrary con-
elusions, finding that the railroads lacked an adeguate supply of freight 




The railroad industry has had a Code of Car Service Rules since 
- ;;r -tfte-
Prior to the promulgation~CC order under review, compliance with 1916. 
the rules was voluntary. The rules were established to govern relations 
of carriers among themselves, particularly, to secure the prompt and 
expeditious use of freight cars. The ICC order made compliance with Car 
Service Rules 1 and 2 mandatory. Car Service Rule 1 provides generally 
that cars in possession of a non-owner railroad at a junction with the owner 
railroad must be delivered empty to the owner, or loaded at that point to or 
via the owner's line. Car Service Rule 2 deals with cars in possession of 
a non-owner railroad at a point other than a junction with the owner railroad. 
Such cars generally must be either returned empty to the owner railroad, 
or returned empty to the railroad from which the car was received under 
load, or loaded to or via the owner's line. The purpose of these rules is 
to assure that empty freight cars in possession of a non-owner railroad will 
be returned, with or without a load, in the direction of the owning line. 
Prior to the ICC order under review, it seems that these rules 
were honored only when convenient for the non-owner railroad in possession. 
Between 1956 and 1965, total freight car ownership, as well as aggregate 
carrying capacity, of American railroads actually declined. During the 
same period, demand for freight cars increased. These two factors, as 
well as others, produced general non-oorrpliance with the Car Service Rules. 
4. 
The result was that an owner railroad had the use of its own cars on an 
average of less than once each month. 
THE ICC DECISION 
Mter its extensive investigation into all phases of freight car owner-
ship and the rules and practices governing their utilization and distribution, 
and the finding that there was "a substantial inadequacy of ownership in 
more than one category of freight cars ... throughout the United states 
among all" Class I railroads, the ICC promulgated the mandatory car 
service rules as a part of a comprehensive set of rules designed to alleviate 
-e -
the frp.ght car shortage. Since its findings regarding the voluntary observance 
of the car service rules indicated that a car owner received the use of its 
own cars on an average of less than once each mo th, the ICC concluded 
that the operation of the car service rules offered little incentive for rail-
roads to purchase larger fleets of general service freight cars, or to ; -"" 
maintain the cars in good repair, since the principal beneficiaries of such 
actions would frequently be other railroads. The ICC noted that under the 
existing system a railroad that owned a sufficient number of cars to 
satisfy its own shippers could suffer more serious car shortages than 
railroads with deficient ownership of cars. The ICC found that making 
observance of the car service rules mandatory would in the long run reduce 
empty car miles, and would place the improv~ utilization of cars within 
neels 
the control of their owners, who could then provide for the --.., of the 
5. 
shippers for whom the cars were acquired. Recognizing that the need for 
exceptions to the rules might arise, the ICC authorized the railroads to 
resolve inequities by negotiation, and authorized ICC officials to provide 
exceptions in order to alleviate inequities and hardships. 
THE USDC DECISION 
The USDC found the order deficient in three respects: 
(1) The mandatory car service rules would clearly benefit the 
owner lines at the expense of the non-owner lines (who had theretofore -
enjoyed the use of cars owned by the owner lines as well as their own cars), 
and the ICC had failed to find a specific freight car shortage, or more 
acute freight car shortage, in the owner lines. "Owner lines" are railroads 
-1-he;,-
that own a sufficient number of cars to satisfy if~ own shippers. '"Non- __ ,.~ / 
owner lines" are railroads that are deficient in car ownership. Since 
there was no specific finding of shortage, or more acute shortage, in the owner 
lines, the USDC reasoned that it was impossible to determine whether the 
public interest in return of cars to the owner lines outweighed the public 
interest in the prompt movement of freight waiting ship :nent at the initial 
unloading point of the car. It is undisputed that mandatory observance of 
6. 
re'f,v.-ire 
the car service rules would 1 Jj · extra switching and delays at unloading 
points, since empty cars under the mandatory rules have to be returned 
in the direction of the owner line, rather than merely shipped out in random 
directions in order of availability. 
(2) While the thrust of the mandatory car service ru~es, as well as 
the other new rules, will be to require the railroad industry to increase its 
fleet of freight cars, the ICC had made no findings regarding the capacity 
of the industry to absorb new freight car capital expenditures. Thus, the 
USDC reasoned that it was impossible to gauge the effect of the new rules 
on the industry, and, because of increased shipping costs which might 
result from increased capital expenditures, on the shipping public. 
(3) Noting that the ICC had conceded that as a practical matter 
there could not be complete observance of the mandatory rules (20% 
non-compliance being considered good performance), and considering the 
foregoing two points, the USDC concluded that the mandatory rules could 
not be considered "reasonable" within the requirement of the statute. 
49 U. S. C. § 1( 4)(a). 
DISCUSSION 
As the opinion of the 3-judge USDC for MD Florida demonstrates, 
the reasoning of the USDC is not persuasive . 
... 
7. 
First, faulting the ICC for not making a specific finding of shortage, 
or more acute shortage, on the own~r lines was not sound, for the ICC 
had found that the freight car shortage was all pervasive throughout the 
United states. Given the shortage on all lines, the ICC was simply 
establishing a policy that during a period of shortage the owner lines 
would have maximum use of the cars in which they had invested. This 
policy is equitable, for the shortage would then bear most heavily on 
the railroads which had failed to purchase an adequate car supply. The 
issue wa;}ot whether the owner lines suffered a more acute shortage, 
but rather which lines should have first call on cars in times of shortage. 
Second, failure to consider the financial effects on the non-owner 
lines and the shipping public is not fatal, for the ICC was justified in 
designing rules to maximize use of freight cars by their owners during the 
period of pervasive shortage. To deny owners the maximum use of their 
cars would in effect penalize the owners, and benefit the non- owners, who ~ / 
had not adequately provided for their needs. The rules are designed to 
serve as an incentive for the non-owner lines, who under the rules will 
have to bear the brunt of their failure to maintain adequate car supplies. 
Non-owner lines will not be compelled to purchase additional freight cars; 
they will simply have to suffer the consequences of their failure to maintain 
adequate car supplies. 
8. 
The ICC did consider the financial effect of the new rules 
upon shippers, and concluded that any burden on shippers in terms of 
"extra switching and short delays" was overbalanced by the "overall 
benefit to be derived when originating lines obtain quick return of their 
system cars. " Although the ICC apparently did not consider the matter 
of additional shipping costs that might result from increased capital 
expenditures for additional freight cars, this seems of little consequence 
in light of the goal of an adequate rail freight system. 
Third, the admission that full compliance with the rules is not 
practicable does not render the rules unreasonable. Adequate provision 
·~ edsts in the ICC order for flexibility and necessary exceptions to the rules. 
1:. Criminal sanction~ the SG says, cannot follow absent proof of 
criminal intent. 
A brief review of the record reveals that the ICC has no effective 
way of measuring and evaluating the freight car shortage problem. Under ~ / 
the existing system, a shipper faced with a shortage of two cars on April 
1 files a shortage report with the ICC indicating a shortage of two cars. 
If those two cars are not supplied for one week, the shipper will have filed 
7 shortage reports indicating a total shortage of 14 cars, when in fact two 
additional cars would have relieved the shortage. Compounding the 
reporting problem is the fact that railroads operate by and large with the 
9. 
use of cars owned by other railroads, and therefore have no incentive to 
remedy their own shortage problems. 
Appellees attack the order primarily on the grounds (1) that it is 
unreasonable, and therefore does not meet the statutory requirement of 
reasonableness, 49 USC § 1(14)(a), and (2) that it is not supported by adequate 
findings, as contemplated by the Administrative Procedure Act. Appellees -
arguments have considerable merit. Taking cars away from non-owner 
railroads and making them available first to owner railroads in times of 
shortage will undoubtedly burden (1) shippers who use the non-owner rail-
roads and have no other choice because of their physical location on the 
o..n& (:z.J non-oumev- r a,/ roaJs 
lines of non-owner railroads, j who will have to bear' the brunt of their 
own failure to maintain adequate car supplies. But whether these burdens 
are "reasonable" and consistent with the public interest can only be deter-
mined against the backdrop of the dimensions of the problem, which is 
one of massive proportions. It seems to me that the ICC has made a 
reasonable choice among a range of unhappy alternatives. At least the 
instant choice will help put the general shortage problem in clearer 
perspective. It also seems clear that detailed findings regarding the 
impact of mandatory car service rules on shippers and non-owner rail-
roads could not reasonablj be made, and that the ICC's general findings 
in this area are sufficient to justify its order in light of the broad provision 
10. 
for exceptions. The ICC has the expertise concerning, and responsibility 
for, broad policy decisions of this character. While the remedy may in 
some respects be drastic, so is the problem. 
REVERSE. 
CEP 
1 · • No. 71-227 UNITED STATES A O ORPORATION, ET AL v. LLEGHENY-LUDLUM STEEL Argued 3/2f/72 
~~~~_(2~ 
/.C.C ."~ I <#-'--~ ~ ·· 
I 1- o/ () ~~ ~ /V-40 trf ~'7.-­
S-1-uY---~~~~~~ 
- ~ 4 LM-y ~ ---eu._ ~ ~ 
f~G ~.' 
~~~1--Hy<--
 -~ ~k_&_ u-zJ..J 1 ~ 
5-e.: I - I '-f c... a--( I C 1/-c:.r- '-".J ~  ~4 
~~~~~~~~ "'/ 
~~ts~~~&-~~· 
I LE': ~ ~ ~-_,;;~ >--~._ • (<;rz k-~ 





' lr{u_ 1Z: ,~ ~~. 
~ho~~~~~ 
~ ~~~ lo-oo/o 
,... . . . 
. '--
1~~~(&J) 
1 ~ ( ff>t_ ,(,,.)'"'4{ af ~) 
~ £-t..; ~ ~~ - .fhJ-~ 
CA_c~. 
~ ~.~~~ -~4 ~~4u; -~ 
~~~~- w~~~~ 
~~~~tl.. . 
/~ I ~- 2-- : ~ Q._ ~ 'V1..--~~/ 
vf~-~~~~~-~~ 
~~~ ~ ~~ IFV-''f-/ ~ 
~~. 91-~~~~ 
o-f~ ~~Ci-~F~ ~ 
tj-v~, ~· ) ~~/~ 
·~~~~~AL-,~~ 
~. 
~1-Z--~ vy) r~ 1 a-yp~ 
~~k4~~ 
~ =t ~ ~ _52-r::~A 
Jr~~ ~ ~~~~l 
~~~ ·~~&.vv~ .. 
{.Lc~. ~~-~w_-0 rzrZs 
- ~ k -~ ~~+) u_,__ 
~~ vj ~ ~'lVJ 
~ ha~ ~ ~~~~~ '~ 
~~. 7 
l~(fwr~) 
H--o r~r U-t- ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~~. 
~t;:, ~~ ~ t<K ~ 
~~~~~. 
1/u_~ (~~~&-1~· ~rz) 
7~~~/l~~~ 




It~'-'- ~ il~-~ ''-12 ~ -~ 
~~~·~. 
J ,, ") 
tJ._vz__ \ :_ ~ ¥--~ ~ 
'7,..~~ ~~~ ~ 
~ ~~ -vJO /(_/~ d-t.--
4. ~ ~ ,,~,, 
Jec ~~~~~~~ 
kt~ ~1ft<-~~ 
r~r. tL<_. ~ ~ /~ ,~~~, 
~~- ~-Y-€1~ 






1(1(~ a~~~~ ·- -0Cu# ~ 
/A_,J~~~~~ -~~~ ~. 
~) ~~7}- ;2./t., ~ 
~ ~ ~- ' '/Vt£?t..~ 





wJ.A ~- LL ~ rrf ~ C6--l-t_-
~~~-
~~·~(~) 
/3 ~()/c.~()-~~~~· ?~1/ 
~M H-rz-~ 




~ '"--<-- ~ ~~ o-f ~ 
P.r-( -~J.-Q ~ L-u~ . 
~~~~~. 
lfp/ss lee 3/27/72 
No. 71-227 U.S. v. ALLEGHNEY-LUDLUM STEEL, et al 
Argued 3/27/72 
Tentative Impressions* 
This case involves the validity of an order of the ICC promulgating 
mandatory rules with respect to the routing of freight cars. 
A hearing examiner listened to testimony for 50 days, took 6, 000 -----------pages of testimony, filed a 63-page report and concluded: 
"The record does nd contain competent evidence upon 
which to base a conclusion as to the adequacy of freight 
car ownership; and that the adoption of the proposed 
car ownership formula, regulations and car service 
rules has not been shown to be justified. " 
The Commission, 18 months later, refused to accept the findings 
of the hearing examiner and ordered the service rules to be observed 
for the purpose of increasing - in time - the number of cars. The 
essential thrust of the rules is to expedite the return of cars to the 
"owning line", which is supposed to have the effect of making other 
lines - which may not own all the cars required for their traffic - to __ ... ., ,..-
purchase such cars. 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the 
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 
at the Conference. 
•, 
2. 
A three-judge court, after recognizing the presumed validity 
of an order of the Commission, found that such order did not meet 
the special statutory requirement of "reasonableness". 
A provision of the applicable Interstate Commerce Act specifies: 
"The Commission may, after hearing ... establish 
reasonable rules, regulations and practices with respect 
to car service .... " 49 U.S. C. § 1(14)(a) 
The three-judge court concluded that the rules were not reason-
able. It pointed out several deficiencies in the Commission's report: -
1. The Commission's report declares that the rules "are not 
designed to improve the utilization of freight cars" - but to induce 
deficiency owner line to acquire additional cars. Thus, the public 
will not be benefitted except perhaps in the long run. 
2. There is no factual showing that the rules will cause the 
"non-owner lines" to acquire cars or additional cars. 
3. The Court found that "the record is devoid of evidence which 
reflects the capacity of the railroad industry to absorb new freight car 
capital~-. : expenditures". • ~ • 1 _. 
~~~ 
4. T:hoQ Qslftle :~;W~i ..ilillfiP@(gt!ltt."'9s;y G.vidence from shippers that 
A 
the rules "would seriously obstruct and undermine railroad car 
utilization, and that the necessary consequences would be delay, 
3. 
wasteful railroad operations, and disruption of shippers' production 
and distribution program. " See jurisdiction statement 23. 
5. The Commission failed "to find a specific freight car 
shortage in the owner-lines. " 
6. The Commission conceded that "there cannot be more than 
80% enforcement of regulations" although a violation "carries criminal 
penalties''. 
My Tentative Views: 
Although an order of the Commission is presumptively valid, 
this presumption is not as strong where the Commission overrules 
its own examiner's report. It seems to me that the railroads and 
shippers have the better argument, and I am inclined to affirm the 
decision below. 
Opinion in 71-227 ~ v. Allegheny-Ludlam has been 
assigned to Bill Rehnquist. When this opinion is circulated I will 
probably write a brief dissent. Want to see the opinion first. 
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MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
Re1 No. 71-227, United States y. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp. 
This is the ICC case involving the promulgation of 
mandatory railroad car service rules. Justice Rehnquist 
has circulated an opinion for the Court upholding the 
ICC rules and reversing the USDC. Douglas, Brennan, and 
Marshall joined immediately. 
The vote at Conference was 7 to 2 to reverse, You 
and the Chief voted to affirm, You have indicated that 
you will probably write a brief dissent, 
Attached is the Rehnquist draft, the bench memo that 
I wrote in the case, and your tentative impressions, 
dictated after Conference. The Rehnquist opinion reaches 
the same conclusions that I reached in the bench memo, 
reasoning along the same lines. 
CEP 
C') 
C" ] 'l.S 
O; fne (.hJ,r Tu 
Mr. Jus-~- C' 
Mr. Just-tee r~·,an 






Justice H:1.r ,hll 
Justice B~r 0;~un 
Justice Powell -----
2nd DRAFT From: Pehnquist J 
SUPREME COURT O:F THE UNITEIJ~'rN'fES = SZJo/?c_ 
No. 71-227 
Rec1rctllated: 




Corporation et aJ. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for the-
Western District of Penn-
sylvania. 
[May -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
In 1969 the Interstate Commerce Commission promul-
gated two "car service rules" which would have the· 
general effect of requiring that freight cars, after being 
unloaded, be returned in the direction of the lines of 
the road owning the car. Several railroa.ds and shippers 
instituted two separate suits under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2321-
,2325 to enjoin enforcement of these rules. In Florida 
East Coast Railway Company v. United States, 327 
F. Supp. 1076 (MD Fla. 1971), the action of the Com-· 
mission was sustained by a three-judge court, but in 
the case now before us a similar court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania held the Commission's order· 
invalid. 325 F. Supp. 352 (WD Pa. 1971). We noted 
probable jurisdiction, 404 U. S. 937, and for the reasons 
hereinafter stated we conclude that tho Commission's 
action here challenged was within the scope of the au-
thority conferred upon it by Congress and conformed 
to procedural requirements. 
The country's railroads long ago abandoned tho cus-
tom of shifting freight between the cars of connect-
ing roads, and adopted the practice of shipping the· 
------
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sa.me loaded car over connecting lines to its ultimate 
destination. The freight cars of the Nation thus be-
came in essence a single common pool, used by all 
roads. This practice necessarily required some arrange-
ments for eventual return of a freight car to the lines 
of the road which owned it, and in Hl02 the railroads 
through their trade association dealt with this and re-
lated problems in a code of car service rules with which 
the roads agreed among themselves to comply. The 
effect of the Commission's order now under revie"· is 
to promulgate t\YO of these rules' as the Commission's 
own, with the result that sanctions attach to their vio-
lation by the railroads. 
Because of critical freight car shortage experienced 
during World War I, Congress enacted the Esch Car 
Service Act of 1917, which empo,yered the Commission 
to establish reasonable rules and practices "·ith rcsprct 
1 "Rule 1. Forri~n c·ar::;, rmpty at a junction with thr homr road,. 
must bo: 
"(a) Loadrd at that jundion to or via homr rails, or. 
"(b) Deli1·errd cmpt,v nt that junction to home road, rxccpt in 
instance,; whrre Rule G h;1R b0en inYoked, or unle.-'s otherwise n~reed 
by roads im·olwd. 
"Rule 2. Foreign cmpt.1· rars other than tho~e cowred in Rule 1 
Rhall be: 
" (a) Load0d to or Yia ownrr's raik 
"(h) Loaded to a dr~lin:-ttion rlo~er to O\\'n!'r's rails than is the· 
loading station or drli1·ered empty to a short line or switrh loading 
road for surh lo:-tclin~. (Car Selection Chnrt is de~igned to aid in 
so srlcrting rars for loading.) 
" ( r) Deli1·rred rmpt~· to the home road at :m~· junction subject 
to Rule 6. 
" (d) Dclil'<'rrd rmpt,v to the road from which original!~· rerci1·ed 
under load, at the junction 11·hrre rcrri1·cd, Except that when han-
dled in road haul f<en·ice, C'ar~ of direct connect ion ownership may 
not be deliYereJ empty to a roail which docs not hal'c a direct ron-
nrrtion with the car owner. 
" (c) Returned empty to the delinring road whrn handlrd only 
in switching service." Jurisdictional Statement 64. 
71-227-0PINIOK 
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to car service by railroads. 49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a). 
The pertinent language of that Act provides: 
"Tho Commission may . . . establish reasonable 
rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car 
service by common carriers by railroad subject to 
this part .... " 
No party to this proceeding has questioned that the 
rules promulgatrcl by the Commission are "rules, regu-
lations, and practices with respect to car service," and 
therefore the issue before us is whether those rules are 
"reasonable" as that term. is used in the Esch Act. The 
court below concluded, and the appellees hero contend, 
that for a number of reasons the rules in question do 
not meet the statutory requirement of reasonableness. 
Appellees also contend that the findings of the Com-
mission are insufficient under the Admi11istrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U. S. C. ~ 551, et seq. 
The record of proceedings beforo the Commission 
establishes that tho Commission has been increasingly 
concerned with recurring shortages of froigh t cars avail-
able to serve the Nation's shippers. It found that 
shortages of varying duration and severity occur both 
as an annual phenomenon at peak loading periods and 
also during times of national emergency. Tho result 
of these shortages ha.s been that roads were unable to 
promptly supply freight cars to shippers who had need 
of them. 
Underlying these chronic shortages of available freight 
cars, the Commission found, 'vas all inadequate supply 
of freight cars owned by the Nation's railroads. The 
Commission concluded that one of the principal factors 
causing this inadequate supply of freight cars "·as the 
operation of the national car pool system. In prac-
tice this system resulted in freight cars being on lines 
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of time, since the rules providing for the return of 
unloaded freight cars in the direction of the lines of 
t.he owning road ·were observed more often than not in 
the breach. Since the owning road was deprived of 
the use of its own freight cars for extended periods of 
time, the Commission found, there was very little in-
centive for it to acquire new freight cars. In addition, 
since a road which owned a supply of freight cars in-
adequate to serve its own on-line shippers could generally, 
by hook or by crook, arrange to utilize cars owned by 
other roads, the national car pool system significantly 
reduced the normal incentive for a railroad to acquire 
sufficient equipment to serve its customers. The rules 
promulgated by the Commission are intended to make 
those railroads whose undersupply of freight cars con-
tributes to the national shortage more directly feel the 
pinch resulting from the shortage which they have helped 
to cause. By thus requiring each road to face up to 
any inadequacies in its ownership of freight cars, the 
rules are intended in the long run to correct the nation-
wide short supply of freight cars which the Commission 
has found to exist. 
Central to the justification for the Commission's pro-
mulgation of these rules is its finding that there was 
a nationwide shortage of freight car ownership. The 
court below assumed the correctness of that finding, 
and we conclude that it was supported by substantial 
evidence. 
Shortly after the Second World War, the Commission 
conducted an investigation into the adequacy of freight 
car supply and utilization by the Nation's railroads. 
The Commission in that proceeding concluded that there 
was "an inadequacy in freight car ownership by rail 
carriers as a group." Recognizing that this inadequacy 
was caused at least in part by the inability of the rail-
71-227-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. ALLEGHENY-LUDLUM STEEL 5 
roads to acquire new equipment, first during an era of 
wartime demand and then during an era of post-war 
boom, the Commission at that time imposed no obliga-
tion on the railroads except to require them to file with 
it their rules and regulations with respect to car service. 
In 1963 the Commission began this investigation into 
the adequacy of car ownership, distribution, and utiliza-
tion. At the conclusion of the investigatory phase of 
the proceeding in 1964, the Commission determined that 
there was a shortage of freight cars in general service. 
323 I. C. C. 48 (1964). Formal notification of pro--
posed rulemaking was then issued, and a questionnaire 
was submitted to the various railroads for the purpose· 
of compiling data on car ownership and use. After 
this data was gathered, railroads, shippers, and other 
interested parties were permitted to file verified state-
ments providing further factual material and to adduce· 
legal arguments. The Commission, through its Bureau 
of Operations, presented to the Hearing Examiner tab-
ular collations of the freight car ownership and use 
data, and suggested a formula by which a railroad might 
compute the sufficiency of its freight car ownership. 
The Bureau also proposed that the entire Code of Car· 
Service Rules adopted by the Association of American 
Railroads be promulgated by the Commission for man-
datory observance. 
Many railroads and shippers opposed mandatory en--
forcement of the rules. Some roads and shippers ap-
peared in favor of at least some mandatory enforce-
ment of the rules, arguing that unless some compulsion 
were used in enforcing them, cars purchased by a rail-
road for use by its shippers would continue to be de-
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After 50 days of hearings, the Trial Examiner issued 
his report, recommending against mandatory enforce-
ment of the car service rules. Although the Com-
mission, prior to referring the matter to him, hnd 
previously made a definitive finding that a shortage of 
freight cars existed, the Examiner's report stated that 
there was no competent evidence in the record devel-
oped before him upon which such a determination could 
be made. The Examiner assigned several reasons for 
recommending against mandatory enforcement of the 
rules. 
The Commission issued a comprehensive opinion dis-
agreeing with the trial examiner in many respects, and 
ordering that two of the rar service rules be promulgated 
as rules of the Commission with sanctions attaching to 
noncompliance. Finding that "the continuing relocation 
of cars on owner's lines is of major importance to the 
maintE-nance of an adequate car supply," ~ the Commis-
sion concluded that the inconvenience in switching and 
delays feared by the shippers was outweighed by the 
long term benefit "·hich would accrue from the lnanda-
tory enforcement of the t'\'0 car service rules. 
AftPr its first order adopting the two rules was is~uecl, 
the Commission considered claims that there was nePd 
for some procedure for exceptions to the mandatory 
enforcement of the rules. A supplemental order then 
established another rule which permitted the railroads 
to seek cxecption from the Commission's Bureau of Oper-
ations, in order to alleviate inequities and hardships. 3 
~ 335 I. C. C. 264 (1969). 
3 "Rule 19-Exerptions 
"Excrptions to thC' rulr~ (presrribcd by the Inter~tate Commerce 
Commission for mnndntory obsciTanre) for the purpose of further 
improving ear suppl:v and utilization, inrrca8ing ayailnbilit~, of 
car;; to their ownC'J's, improving the efficiency of rnilrond operations. 
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The court below held that the rules \\·ere not "reason-
able,'' as that term is used in the Ef:ch Act, for three 
reasons. First, although there was a general finding 
of a nation\\·ide freight car shortage, the court said 
that a specific shortage on o\\·ner lines should have 
been found in order to justify the promulgation of these 
rules. Second, it said there should have been a find-
ing as to the financial effects upon the railroads a.nd 
shippers who " ·oulcl be affected by the rules. Finally, 
it supported its conclusion that the rules were not "rea-
sonable" by the fact that even though violation of the 
rules could be enforced by monetary penalties, the Com-
mission nonetheless conceded that the obtaining of com-
plete compliance with them would be impossible. 
The standard of judicial review for actions of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission in general. Western 
Che1nical Company v. Un·ited States, 271 U. S. 268 
(1926), and for actions taken by the Commission under 
the authority of the Esch Act in particular, Assigned 
Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564 (1927), is well established by 
prior decisions of this Court. \V e do not weigh the 
evidence introduced before the Commission; "·e do not 
inquire into the wisdom of the regulations "·hich the 
Commis ion promulgates, a11cl we inquire into the sound-
ness of the reasoning by which the Commission reaches 
its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are 
rationally supported. In judicially reviewing these 
particular rules promulgated by the Commission, we 
must be alert to the differing standard governing review 
of the Commission's exercise of its rulemaking authority, 
or allcYiating inrquitics or hardships, may br authorized by the di-
rector or assistant clirrctor of the Bureau of Operations, Interstate 
Commerce Commi~~ion, ·washington, D. C." 
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on the one hand, and that governing its adjudicatory 
function, on the other: 
"In the cases cited, the Commission was determin-
ing the relative rights of the several carriers in a 
joint rate. It was making a partition; and it per-
formed a function quasi-judicial in its nature. In 
the case at bar, the function exercised by the Com-
mission is wholly legislative. Its authority to legis-
late is limited to establishing a reasonable rule. 
But in establishing a rule of general application, it 
is not a condition of its validity that there be ad-
duced evidence of its appropriateness in respect 
to every railroad to which it will be applicable. 
In this connection, the Commission, like other legis-
lators, may reason from the particular to the gen-
eral." Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 583 (1927). 
The findings of the Commission as to a nationwide 
shortage of freight cars was based primarily on data 
submitted by the railroads themselves covering the years 
1955 through 1964. Over this 10-year period total 
freight car ownership of Class I railroads dropped 12.4o/o , 
and aggregate carrying capacity of those railroads 
dropped 57o . Over the same period revenue tons orig-
inated dropped 2.9 %. The decline in ownership of 
plain box cars, as opposed to more sophisticated types 
of cars, was even more dramatic; ownership of cars 
over the 10-year period in question dropped 22.1 ro , 
while aggregate carrying capacity of such cars dropped 
18.97o . Testimony of witnesses for the National In-
dustrial Traffic League, the Western Wood Products 
Association, the American Ply,vood Association, and the 
Vulcan Materials Association also supported the finding 
of a car shortage. These statistics, taken together with 
the Commission's post-war determination of a car short-
age, portray a gradually worsening ratio of carrying 
capacity to revenue tons originated. 
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The Commission further found that freight car short-
ages, in the sense that a particular road was unable to· 
promptly supply freight cars to particular shippers who 
needed them, have occurred chronically, both during 
peak loading seasons each year and during times of 
national emergency. It is quite true, as appellees sug-
gest, that inability of the roads to supply cars to ship-
pers at particular times is not conclusive evidence that 
there is a national shortage of freight car ownership. 
Conceivably, freight car ownership could be adequate, 
yet poor utilization of the supply results in shortages. 
Nonetheless, the Commission may fairly rely on these 
chronic shortages in availability of freight cars as one 
factor upon which to base its conclusion that there was 
an overall shortage of ownership of freight cars. 
The Commission also found that a surprisingly low 
percentage of freight cars was actually on the tracks 
of the roads owning the cars at any given time, and 
that this percentage had been decreasing during the 
period in question. In March, 1966, less than 30% of 
the railroads' plain box cars were on the line of their 
owner, and during the preceding year that percentage 
remained mostly in the low thirties. The Commission 
summarized the factual situation it found in these words: 
"From the evidence adduced and the data col-
lected, it is obvious that an adequate freight car 
supply is as much a problem today as it was during 
the period considered in our last proceeding in 1947. 
Car service which involves a shortage of approxi-
mately one out of every ten cars ordered or even 
one out of every fifteen cars ordered demands that 
every available means be marshalled to eliminate 
such deficiencies." 
One of the means marshalled by the Commission to 
eliminate such deficiencies was the promulgation of the 
two rules under attack here. The thrust of these rules 
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is to require that freight cars after unloading be dis-
patched in the direction of the lines of the owning road. 
Thus the Commission concluded after investigation 
that the railroads were frequently unable to supply 
shippers with freight cars. It reasoned from this fact, 
and from statistics shm1ing a significantly more rapid 
decliue in aggregate carrying capacity than in revenue 
tons originated, that an underlying and important cause 
of the unavailability of box cars to shippers was that 
the Nation's railroads simply did not jointly own a 
sufficient number of freight cars to adequately serve 
shippers of goods over their lines. Because of the ex-
istence of the national pool of freight cars, whereby 
roads may service on-line shippers with foreign cars, 
it was difficult, if not impossible, to relate inadequate 
ownership statistically to any particular road or roads. 
The Commission therefore chose to make mandatory 
two of the car service rules which would have the 
effect of aligning more closely than at present the 
ownership of freight cars on the part of the road 
with the availability of those freight cars to the own-
ing road for use of its on-line shippers. The result 
of these rules, over the long term, the Commission rea-
soned, would be to bring home to those roads who 
themselves had an inadequate supply of cars to serve 
their on-line shippers that fact, and alf'o without doubt 
to supply incentive to such roads to augment their sup-
ply of freight cars in order to adequately serve their 
on-line shippers. The natioual supply of freight cars 
would thereby be augmented, and the railroads as a 
result would be better able to supply the needs of 
shippers. 
Appellees' fundamental substantive contention is that 
the short term consequences of the enforcement of these 
rules will so seriously disrupt established industry prac-
tices as to outweigh any possible long term benefits in 
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service which might accrue from them, and that there-
fore the rules are not "reasonable" as that term is used 
in the Esch Act.' While of course conceding that the 
railroads themselves originally promulgated the rules for 
voluntary compliance, appellcs argue that because the 
rules have been observed largely in the breach, usages 
and practices have grown up which permit far more 
efficient utilization of the existing fleet of freight cars 
than would be permitted if the t"·o rules in question 
were enforced by the Commission. Appellees state that 
in reliance on the existence of a national pool of freight 
cars, and on the consequent availability to shippers of 
cars not owned by the line originating the shipment, 
manufacturing plants have been located and enlarged. 
They claim that enforcement of the rules now would 
seriously hamper the movement of freight traffic from 
these and other shipping points. 
It may be conceded that the immediate effect of the 
Commission's order will be to disrupt some established 
practices with respect to the handling and routing of 
freight cars, and on occasion to cause serious incon-
venience to shippers and railroads alike. If the Com-
mission 'vere thrusting these regulations upon an 
admittedly smoothly functioning transportation indus-
try, well supplied with necessary rolling stock and ade-
quately serving all shippers, the rationality of its action 
might well be open to question. 
But such is not the case. The Commission's finding 
that there arc recurring periods of significant length 
4 Three separate briefs lun·e bern filed here in support of appellees, 
f'nch of which understandnbly presents the rase for affirmance in 
slightly differing form, and no one of whirh completely adopts the 
reasoning of the District Court. We have not found it necessary in 
deciding the case to deal with e~ch separate argument in support 
of affinnance, since we belieYe all of them to be genernlly subsumed 
under those claims with which we denl. 
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when there is not an adequate freight car supply to 
service shippers is supported by substantial evidence. 
While the flexible system of routing freight Cl}fS pres-
ently in existence may well have short term advantages 
both for some shippers and some roads, the Commis-
sion could quite reasonably conclude that it has long 
term drawbacks as well. The otherwise adverse effect 
on a road's ability to serve shippers which would result 
from its owning too few cars is cushioned; the beneficial 
effect on a road's ability to serve shippers which would 
result from its owning a sufficient supply of cars is dis-
sipated. The Commission undoubtedly felt that rules 
designed only to most efficiently utilize the existing 
inadequate fleet of freight cars would have little or no· 
effect on the nationwide shortage of such cars. Indeed, 
the appellees stress the concession by the Commission 
that these rules "are not designed to improve the utiliza-
tion of freight cars, except insofar as return loading is 
compatible with the primary objective of increasing 
availability of cars to the owner." 
But only if we were to hold that Congress, in enact-
ing the Esch Car Service Act, intended that the only 
criterion which the Commission might consider in estab-
lishing "reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with 
respect to car service" was the optimum utilization of 
an existing fleet of freight cars, however numerically 
inadequate that fleet might be, could this argument be 
sustained. Neither the language which Congress used 
nor the legislative history of the Act supports such a 
narrow reading of its grant of authority to the Com-
mission. On the record before it, the Commission was 
justified in deciding that the railroads and the shippers 
were afflicted with an economic illness which might 
have to get worse before it got better. Existing prac-
tices respecting car service tended to destroy any incen-
tive on the part of railroads to acquire new cars, and 
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the resulting failure to acquire new equipment con-
tributed to an overall nationwide shortage of freight 
cars which prevented the railroad industry from ade--
quately serving shippers. Cars service rules which would 
tend to restore incentive to the various roads to aug-
ment their supply of freight cars, even at the temporary 
expense of optimum utilization of the existing fleet of 
freight cars, conform under these circumstances to the 
:statutory requirement of reasonableness. 
Appellees support their claim that the Commission's 
promulgation of these rules is not "reasonable" under the· 
Esch Act on two grounds not directly related to the rules' 
claimed adverse effect on the ability of the roads to 
serve shippers. They attack the absence of a Commis-
sion finding as to the financial ability of roads inade-
quately supplied with freight cars to purchase new ones, 
and they cite the conceded impossibility of obtaining 
complete compliance with the rules as additional evi-
dence of their unreasonableness. 
The Commission's order does not require any road to· 
purchase any freight cars. It abridges to some extent 
the existing practice among railroads of treating the 
freight cars which they own as a pool, and for that reason 
may ultimately cause roads which do not have an ade-
quate supply of freight cars to serve on-line shippers. 
to be less able to serve such shippers than they are now. 
If, as a result of this fact, such roads are placed under-
economic and competitive pressure to acquire additional 
freight cars, there is certainly no principle of law we know 
of which would require the Commission to permit them 
to avoid this economic pressure by continuing to borrow 
freight cars acquired and owned by other lines. 
The Commission, acceding to the arguments of ship--
pers and railroads on reheariug, agreed that mandatory 
total compliance with the rules promulgated would be 
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involved, and accordingly a procedure by which ex-
ceptions might be applied for was established. How the 
provision for exceptions will be administered in practice 
is a matter about which we could only speculate at 
present. It is well established that an agency's au-
thority to proceed in a complex area such as car service 
regulation by means of rulrs of general application en-
tails a concomitant authority to provide exemption pro-
cedures in order to allow for special circumstances. 
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 300 U. S. 747, 784-786 
(1968). What bearing any of these factors might have 
on an action under the provisions of 49 U. S. C. § 1 (17) 
for the collection of penalties for a violation of the rules 
in question is a question best decided in such a proceed-
ing. The fact that violation of a rule promulgated under 
the Esch Car Service Act may be the basis for a proceed-
ing to collect a penalty does not either expand or con-
tract the statu tory definition of "reasonable" found in 
that Act. 
What we have said thus far is enough to indicate our 
view that there is sufficient relationship bet"·een the 
Commission's conclusions and the factual bases in the 
record upon which it relied to substantively support this 
exercise of its authority under the Esch Act. AppelJees 
press on us an additional claim that the Commission 
failed to comply with the provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 551, et seq., citing Bur-
lington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156 
(1962) and Secretary of Agriculture v. Uniled Stales, 347 
U. S. 645 ( 1954). Burlingto11 Truck Lines is clearly 
inapposite, however, since in that case the Court "·as. 
dealing ''"ith adjudication, not rulemaking. In criticiz-
ing the Commission's action there, the Court said that 
"the Administrative Procedure Act \vill not permit us to 
accept such adjudicatory practice," 371 U. S. 156, 167. 
In Secretary of Agricullure v. United States, supra, the 
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Court reviewed the Commission's action, not under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, but on the basis of its 
prior cases establishing the standard for judicial review of 
agency action. Commenting that "in dealing with tech-
nical and complex matters like these, the Commission 
must necessarily have wide discr~tion in formulating ap-
propriate solutions," the Court "·ent on to conclude that 
the Commission "has not adequately explained its depar-
ture from prior norms and has not sufficiently spelled out 
the legal basis of its decision." 347 U. S., at 652-653. 
For the reasons previously stated, we find no such in-
firmities here. 
This Court has held that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act applies to proceedings before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. 
Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173, 192 (1959). Ap-
pellees claim that the Commission's procedure here de-
parted from the provisions of 5 U. S. C. §§ 556 and 557 
of the Act. Those sections, however, govern a rule-
making proceeding only when 5 U. S. C. § 553 so requires. 
The latter section, dealing generally with rulemaking, 
makes applicable the provisions of §§ 556 and 557 only 
"when rules are required by statute to be made on the 
record after opportunity for an agency hearing .... " 
The Esch Act, authorizing the Commission "after hear-
ing, on complaint or upon its own initiative without 
complaint, [to] establish reasonable rules, regulations, 
and practices with respect to car service .... " 49' 
U.S. C.§ 1 (14)(a), does not require that such rules 
"be made on the record." 5 U. S. C. § 553. That dis-
tinction is determinative for this case. "A good deal 
of significance lies in the fact that some statutes do ex-
pressly require determinations on the record." 2 K. 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 13.08 p. 225· 
(1958). Sections 556 and 557 need be applied "only 
where the agency statute, in addition to providing a 
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hearing, prescribes explicity that it be 'on the record.'" 
Siegel v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F. 2cl 778, 785 
(CADC 1968); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Inc. v. Dillon, 
344 F. 2d 497,500 n. 9 (CADC 1965). Cf. First National 
Bank v. First Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 225 F. 2d 
33 (CADC 1955). Because the proceedings under re-
view were an exercise of legislative rulemaking power 
rather than adjudicatory hearings as in Wong Yang Sung 
v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950), and Ohio Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U. S. 292 
(1937); and because 49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a) does not 
require a determination "on the record" the provisions 
of 5 U. S. C. §§ 556, 557, were inapplicable. 
This proceeding therefore, was governed by the pro-
visions of 5 U. S. C. § 553 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, requiring basically that notice of proposed 
rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register, that 
after notice the agency give interested persons an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rulemaking through appro-
priate submissions, and that after consideration of the 
record so made the agency shall incorporate in the rules 
adopted a concise geueral statement of their basis and 
purpose.5 The "Findings" and "Conclusions" embodied 
in the Commission's report fully comply with these re-
quirements, and nothing more was required by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. 
We conclude that the Commission's action in promul-
gating these rules was substantively authorized by the 
Esch Act and procedurally acceptable under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. The judgment of the District 
Court must therefore be 
Reversed. 
r. 49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a) likewi~c rC'quires the Commis~ion to 
conduct a hearing before promulgating rules. 
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CHAMBERS OF March 31, 1972 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
Dear Chief: 
As I ~ay be out of the city when you make 
this week's assignments, may I suggest that No. 
71-227 - United States v. Allegheny Ludlam Steel 
Corp. be assigned to Bill Rehnquist '!' 
w.l~.~j 
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Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join, with thanks, your 
opinion for the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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